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REASONABLE RATES

T

HE principles underlying the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission are, for the most part, admittedly sound
,
principles, and their number is not inordinately great. But
to lawyers, and students of law, the application of these principles
seems, in casual reading, to be made as whim or fancy dictates. It
is a frequent complaint of the lawyer that there is no law in rate
<;1.ecisions.
The law is there, the principles are there, and their application
has been usually made with wisdom. But there seems no clear continuity of controlling principles. There has been but a frail structure by stare decisis erected. Almost every question is to some extent
looked upon as new.
The reason for this condition is found in the fundamental fact
that the. factors controlling rates are variable. Bvery element that
enters into rate-making has a variable value. Its weight is determined by other elements. So that .in no controversy can a fixed or
determining value be attached to any one factor considered alone.
At first sight this gives to the rate decisions a complexion of
. divergence and contrariety that is puzzling and confusing. A rate
is unreasonable in one instance because the length of the haul is
ignored, and in another instance the mileage is unconsidered in the
':final determination. A preference is declared undue against one
19cality because of its geographical position, and in another case
the natural advantages of location are equalized by similar rates to a
less fortunately sittiated community.
rhe variableness of these elements complicate rate questions. But
underlying the variable values, there are certain fixed principles, and
if this distinction be borne in mind, it will become apparent that the
rate decisions are, as a rule, in harmony, and that a system of rate
law is being built up, precedents are being established, and principles
fixed.
The factors entering into rates must be looked upon as a chemist
conceives of atoms of strong and wide affinities. Place them in a
solution of ~ rate controv~rsy and they will combine with many other
atoms, and the resultant molecules give the final compound its
identity.
No rate factor can be considered alone. Every rate factor must be
considered relatively. The effect of the factors on each other must
be first determined before the final result can be announced.
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This sounds ~ore complex ·and more difficult than in fact it is.
An examination of the elements, their variability, their effect upon
each other, is not so abstruse a problem. While mathematical accuracy in rates cannot be maintained, it is easily within the realm
of adm!nistrative justice to decide between reasonable and unreasonable rates, and just and unjust discrimination.
The duty of common carriers to make just and reasonable charges
'for services rendered in the transportation of persons and property
existed at common law.1 It is the same duty that is declared in tJie
A~ TO lti:GUI,ATE COMMERCE.

The reasonableness of charges is a mixed question of law and of
fact. It raises the issue of the qualitative character of an act. To
determine this issue certain evidential facts must be found and from
these facts a oonclusion is drawn.
The Commission's ultimate conclusion must be drawn in accordance with certain legal principles. The legal principles are few, and
govern very brojldly the· determination of issues. Before the legal
principles are applied, there may be, and usually are, certain inferences of fact. The legal principles are fixed and conclusive. The
inferences of fact may change or be affected by additional facts, and
are always subject to rebuttal. The two bodies of rules should be
considered separately.
I. The right at common law to regulate the ·charges of a common carrier arose from the doctrine that when private property was
devoted to a public use, the public acquired a right to the use upon
reasonable terms.
In Munn v. Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld the doctrine that
in property devoted to public use, the public had such an interest
that it might regulate through legislatures the charges, and consequently the revenues derived from such property by the owners.
This power of regulation by the legislative authority was no~ subject
to the review of courts. "Where property has been Clothed ,with a
public interest, the legislature may fix a limit to that which shall in
law be reasonable for its use. This limit binds the courts as well as
the people. If it has been improperly fixed, the legislature, not the
courts must be appealed to for the change."2
Later decisions, while confirming the right to regulate, began to
limit the legislative authority, until in Smyth v. Ames,~ the Supreme
Court declared that rates prescribed by legislative authority must'
yield a fair return upon the property, and when rates so prescn"bed

a

i Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. n3.
• Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., g4 U. S. 164, 178•
• 169 u. s. 466.
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did not yield a fair return they were confiscatory, and amounted to
a deprivation of property without due process of law.
A minimum was marked to legislative authority. A line was
drawn, beneath which confiscation set in. Confiscation, or deprivation of property, contrary to the constitutional right, is brought
about by a revenue inadequate to constitute a fair return.
This deprivation of property may consist of two kinds: (I) The
revenue derived from the rates prescribed may be less than the
operating expenditures,4 In this event the rates are unreasonably
low and to attain reasonableness· the rates i;nust yield an equivalent
of the expenditures.5
(2) The revenue derived from the rates prescribed may yield so
smaU. a margin above operating expenditures that (a) the corpus of
the property is by this 'process being confiscated by rendering it undesirable to purchasers and therefore decreasing its value, or (b) the
owners are deprived of their property right of a return upon the
iµvestment. When ·the sufficiency of the margin above expenditures
is in question, it becomes necessary to determine what constitutes a
fair return. How shall it be analyzed? No bard and fast rule can
, be prescribed. It is a field for discretion as broad as the field of
inquiry into the reasonableness of rates.
It has been rather generally conceded that since the decision of
·the Supreme Court in Smyth v. Antes,6 one absolute essential of
rates is that they· must yield a fair return upon the value of the
property. This is not an absolute right, enforceable at the expense
of all other rights and persons. In the summing up of principles laid
down in that case Mr. Justice HARLAN said :7
"A State enactment, or regulations made under the authority of
a State enactment, establishing rates for the transportation of persons or property by railroad that will not admit of the carrier earning such compensation as under· all the circumstances is just to it
and to the public would deprive such carrier of its property without
due process of law."
·
The earlier doctrine announced in Co1.1ington & Lexington Turnpike R. Co. v. Sanford,8 has been neglected, perhaps, but not utte,rly
abandoned. In that case the court said:
• By operating is meant aU oirerhead expenses, etc.
.-.. In this connection a question may- arise as to the. ·carrier'• expenditures. They.
should not be reckless, atravagant, or wasteful. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman
X43 U. S. 339, 346.
• 169
466.
T 169 U. S. at page 5#i;.

u. s.

• 164

u. s.
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"The public cannot be subjected to unreasonable rates in order
simply that stockholders may eam dividends. * * * If a corporation cannot maintain such a highway and earn dividends for stockholders, it is a misfortune for it and them which the constitution
does not require to be remedied by imposing unjust burdens upon the
public."
The later cases following Sm'j•th v. Ames on this question, North'em Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota,9 Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v.
Conley,1° the Minnesota Rate Cases,11 have not denied the factor
value of the service to the public.
If the return upon the property were the only factor in rate-making the problem would be simple. But it must be considered in combination with that equally potent factor, the value of the service to
the public. ·Here are two conflicting and opposing elements, constantly tending to neutralize or restrict each other. And the fairness
of one depends upon the other, so that no formula can be blindly
followed.
It leads us back into the original inquiry-the reasonableness of
rates. A fair return may by force of circumstances be a fraction
of one per cent. It is to be remembered that the legal inference that
rates must yield a fair return is applicable upon rate structures as a
whole. It is not a practical consideration in determining the reasonableness of isolated rates. Theoretically each rate has a cost of
service and a revenue producing power, but only theoretically. Railway accounting has not progressed so far.
A whole rate st.ructure produces a known sum, and an average
cost of service, in units of ton miles, or car miles, may be estimated.
But it is obvious that rates on different commodities vary above and
befow the average.
A single commodity may not be segregated and a rate therefore·
imposed that is less than the cost of service.12 But if rates on a
single commodity yield any revenue in excess of cost, no legal inference is applicabfo, because the inargin then raises the question of a·
fair return.
2. That rates shall not be confiscatory is tpe only element in the
reasonableness of rates that has a fixed legal inference.
Attempts have been made to have the Supreme Court declare other
legal inferences.. And while they have uniformly failed, an examina• .236

u. s.

585, 599.

u. s. 605.
u .230 u. s. ;t52.
:It .236

12 Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota, .236 U. S. 585; and
former cases.

1ff:

review of
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tion of those conside;ed in the case of Illinois Central R. R. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission,1 8 is very enlightening upon this
subject.
In that case there were presented to the court the following circumstances, which it was claimed raised the legal presumption that
the rate was reasonable:
(I) A rate legally published.
( 2) A rate made by competition.
(3) A rate as low as rates of other. carriers on similar com.modities for similar distances .
. (4) A rate maintained for a series of years, and under which
there has been a continuous increase in business.
(5) Rates under which a commodity moves with profit to a
shipper, reduced as the market declines, increased as the market
. advances, the percentage of increase in th~ rate bf!ing less than the
percentage .of increase in the commodity.
( 6) Rates decreased during a market depression and advanced to
their former level when the depression ceases.
(7) Increases in a schedule of rates to meet increases in expenditures to -care for an abnormal iiicrease of traffic when the gross
earnings of the carrier yield no greater net income. ·
(9 and IO) Increases in rates to pay for improvements.
(II) A rate must yield the cost of movement and contribute its
fair share of operating expenses, taxes, and fixed charges.
Said the courtu in discussing these contentions :
"A presumption is the e.xpression of a process of reasoning and
most, if not all, the rules of indirect evidence may be expressed as
such. We cannot go far in the investigation of any controverpy
without finding ourselves compelled to infer one fact from another,
b11t we would not therefore be justified in declaring such inferences
legal maxims. It is tq this that appellants invite us and seek to erect
disputable inferences from conduct that may ha'Ve many explanations
into intendments of law. * * *·
"It is conceded, as we have said, that the presumptions contended
by appellants are mixed.of law and fact, ·except, may be, those
which we shall presently consider. If either element is dominant in
such presumptions, it must be that of fact. In other words, the fact
must be ascertained before the law draws its inference."
The court might· have gone further, and declared that not only
n"Ust the fact be ascertained, but the surrounding circumstances and

for

206 u. s. 441.
1' .206 U. S. 441, at pp. 459, 46o.
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conditions, before the law draws its inference. For if it be established, for example, that a rate was made by competition, that factor
alone is not a presumption of its reasonableness. It is material and
pertinent evidence, and something to which the Commission should
give weight. But any presumption arising from it alone, is so faint
and weak that it must have support. ·
And as pointed out by the court in the above cited case,11l a legally
filed rate has no presumption of reasonableness. "Of course, if a
complaint should be filed before the Commission, and no proof adduced to support it, we cannot doubt but that the complaint would
be dismissed; but this because of the principle that the party who
asserts the affirmative in any controversy· ought to prove the assertion, and that he who denies may rest in his denial 'until, at least, the
probable truth of the matter asserted has been establishedt
Various elements that enter into the reasonableness of rates have
from time to time been approved by the Supr~e Court.16 But the
approval does not give them any force as legal presumptions, because
no single element is controlling.
The Commission has the power to prescribe reasonable rates.
We are met at the outset with the difficulty of defining except in
the vaguest terms what is a reasonable rate. We can only entunerate the factors entering into rate. making, and, remembering .that they
are variable, and interdependent, state the approximate value to be
attached to each.
In Proposed Advances in Freight Rates,11 the Commission said:•
''Every question as to the reasonableness of a rate may present itself
in two aspects. First, is the rate reasonable, estimated by the cost
and value of the sen.ice, and as compared with other commodities;
second, is it reasonable in the absolute, regarded more nearly as a
tax laid upon the people who ultimately pay that rate."
u 206 U, S. 441,. at p. 46411 Competition: United States v. Freight Ass'n., 166 U. S. 33!H United States v,
Joint Traffic Ass'n., 171 U. S. 505, 577; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago
Great Western R. R. Co., 209 U. S. 108, n9.
Value of the service to the shipper! Tens & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com·
merce Commission, 162 U. S. 197.
Cost of service: Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, and
cases cited.
Value of the commodity transp_orted: Kansas City South;rn Ry. v. Carl, 227 U. S.
639, 650, 6i;3.
.
.
Policy" o( the carrier 'in fixing
not an element of reasonableness: Southern
Pacific Co. v. interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 444Rates long in effect: Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 6or.
·Local and through rates: Minnesota & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S •
.:zs 7, 2~2; Chicago RY.: "TonipkinS, 176
167.
119 'I. c. c. 382, '401.
.
:

rates

v.

u, s.
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The cost of service and value of service are the evidential facts
that determine the reasonableness of rates.
· A comparison with rates on other commodities is only a method
of det~rmining the cost and value of service. The cost and value of
':"?ervice as a whole in the rate on the cominodity compared has either
been approved as reasonable or is assumed to be reasonable.
What reasonableness is in' the.absolute would be difficult to say.
Rates may be compared to taxes for illustrative purposes but the
comparison brings us little nearer a d~finite finding of reasonableness.
The cost of the.service to the carrier. for which the charge is made
is a factor tending to increase rates. 'fhe ,.alue of the service to the
shipper is a factor tending to decrease the rates. Each factor is made
up of many elements that vary in number and in weight. And sometimes the same element enters into both factors.
Elements that enter into the cost of service may be grouped under
two heads: those inherent to the commodity, and those inherent to
the instrumentality of transportation. Under the first group would
come weight, package, value, perishable nature, bulk, loading quality.
Under the second group would come distance, car capacity, speed,
branch or ma]µ line, topography of country, direction of movement,
·empties, car supply, volume of traffic, direction of traffic, construe, tion cost and maintenance.18
Elements that enter into the value of service to shipper are competition (rail, water and market), value, and nature of the commodity.19
'
· The Commission has from time to time announced various inferences of fact that arise from certain of ·these elements. But, as has
been noted, all of these inferences are ·subject to the particular
circumstances and conditions of each case.
As illustrative of how the value of any one element is affected by
other elements, .we may examine distance. Distance is an element
entering into the cost of service whose effect is apparent at a glance.
But as it is obvious that rates can not be based on a mileage scale,
the Clement of distance is used in arriving at the per ton mile earnings of the carrier·frotn ·11 particular rate. 20 The maxim that the rate
per _ton mile should decrease with the length of the haul is logical
and fair. But the rate can not be measured by this unit alone. The
bulk of .Mttlm'odities; wading capacity, etc, must be considered. So
18 This grouping is only for convenience, and -is not suggested as exhaustive either
as to groups or elements.
1
,., See Watkins, Shippers and Carriers, §u~'.
,. This is fignred by reducing the rate per 100 pounds to a rate per ton and then
dividing by the distance of the hau1 on which it applies.
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the car mile revenue is considered. The revenue per car mile21 gives
effect to the additional elements named. But the car mile revenue
unit must be considered with a view to traffic conditions. If the
commodity is hauled in special equipment, the return haul is empty,
and commodities in usual equipment may involve a percentage of
empty cars returned. 22
So the direction of movement, the return haul of empties, must be
tonsidered. And a further unit of comparison, train mile earnings;
is used, which includes the additional elements of volume and
tonnage. 23
It is evident that the facts concerning these elements, especially
those relating to cost of service, would be very difficult for a shipper
to adduce, and are peculiarly within the possession of the carriers.
Congress has recognized this condition by enacting in the 19ro
amendment to the act to regulate commerce that the carrier must
prove the reasonableness of any advance in rates.
\Vhen an existing rate is assailed as unreasonable by a shipper he
is forced to rely mainly upon rate comparisons. And, as has been
noted, this is only a convenient form of exhibiting the result of
similar cost and value of service instead of exhibiting the constituent elements, the rates used as comparisons having either been
found reasonable by the Commission, or assumed so from their
publication by the carriers. It is essential, of course, that the rates
used for comparative purposes should be over lines and between
points where the conditions and circumstances are similar. Pissimilarity of conditions means dissimilarity of the constituent elements out of which the rates are constructed, and the comparison
would have no probative value.u
The technical nature of the evidence necessary to determine the
reasonableness of rates, the inability of the shipper to adduce it, and
its possession by the carrier, are responsible to some extent for the
procedure befor~ the Commission. The complainant can rarely unaided make out his case. The defendant must supply the evidential
facts. Arid in effect, every complaint carries with it a prayer for
discovery.
Decisions of the Commission and of the courts have often recited
that the reasonableness of a rate is a question of fact, and that the
21This is derived from multiplying the average carload weight of the ccimmoditT"
by the rate and dividing by the distance· of the haul.
22 Western Rate Advance Case, (1~15), 35 I. C. C. 497.
22 For authorities see 'Vatkins, Shippers and Carriers, §g9.
"Dallas Freight Bureau v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 12 I. C. C. :n3; Ctark & Co.
v. Buffalo & S. Ry., 18 I. C. C. aBo; Parfrey v. C. M. & P. Ry. Co., 20 I. C. C. 103;
Watkins, Shippers and Carriers, §no, and citations.
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:findi~g of the Commission thereon is final. And as the process of
determining the evidential facts, and drawing therefrom their proper
inference and legal conclusions, is often obscure, it sometimes seems
that rate decisions are mysteriously effected. It may appear that the
Commission thrusts its hand into the darkness, and a reasonable rate
is plucked back like a rabbit from a conjuror's hat.
·
There is, of course, no step taken towards the ultimate finding
which is not logical.
·
The process of determining the reasonableness of rates consists of
two stages. The first stage, finding the evidential facts, is within the
exclusive discretionary power of the Commission and its findings so
far are final. The second stage is deductive reasoning, and presents
a question of law. It is a question of law, for example, when the
Commissi9n determines the reasonableness of rates upon the conclusi9n that. rates -equitable to shipper~ are therefore reasonable.25
Here the evidential facts did not warrant the conclusion of reasonableness.
When the evidence is a "mass of facts--out of which experts
could have named a rate,'' the Commission's conclusion from those
facts, is a conclusion of law. ThC'.! findings of fact being final, the
legal conclusion therefrom was proper.28
The conclusion of reasonableness must always be supported by
evidential facts. When the facts conflict, or their relative weight is
in question, the Commi1sion's finding is final. And in this field there
are wide limits' to the flexibility of its judgment. But it is not a
tribunal of arbitrary nor ~imited powers.

Washington, D. C.
• Southern· Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
"' Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R.,

219
222

U. S. 433, 444U. S. 541, 550.

